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State v. Booze: 
TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY 
ALLOWING STATE 
TO REOPEN ITS 
CASE AT 
REBUTTAL STAGE 
TO PRESENT 
CUMULATIVE AND 
CORROBORATIVE 
WITNESS TESTI-
MONY WHICH IM-
PAIRED 
DEFENDANTS' FAIR 
TRIAL RIGHTS. 
In State v. Booze, 334 
Md. 64, 637 A.2d 1214 (1994), 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land unanimously held that a 
prosecutor's mistaken belief that 
eyewitness testimony was ap-
propriate rebuttal evidence was 
not good cause for reopening 
the State's case-in-chief. In so 
holding, the court determined 
that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it allowed the 
State to reopen its case at the 
rebuttal stage to present cumu-
lative and corroborative eye-
witness testimony which im-
paired defendants' right to a fair 
trial. 
Respondents Donald 
Eugene Booze, Jr. and Allen 
Shelton Snead were charged 
with the murders of Antonio 
Brandon Henderson and Isaac 
Durant. In the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City, witnesses 
for the State testified to seeing 
Respondents fire guns and to 
hearing gunshots. Another State 
witness, Officer Constantine, 
testified that he had encoun-
tered Snead fleeing from the 
area of the shooting and had 
heard gun shots coming from 
the direction from which Snead 
was running. After the State 
rested, Snead presented a de-
fense theory supportive ofOffi-
cer Constantine's testimony, 
namely, that respondents were 
fleeing from a gun battle in which 
they were not involved. 
The State then presented 
a rebuttal witness, Perry S. 
Knight. When it became appar-
ent that Knight was also an eye-
witness to the murders, Respon-
dents objected, stating that the 
rebuttal was improper. The 
State argued thatKnight'stesti-
mony, which accounted for the 
gunshots fired while respon-
dents fled the scene, directly 
rebutted Snead's defense theory. 
Upon discovering that 
the State learned of Knight 
prior to closing its case, the trial 
court ruled that his testimony 
was proper rebuttal to the ex-
tent that it explained the source 
of the gunfire from which Re-
spondents fled. However, the 
court expressed concern about 
the rest of Knight's testimony. 
As to that portion of Knight's 
testimony, the court determined 
that it reflected an eyewitness 
account of what occurred and 
was not rebuttal at all. Rather, 
it amounted to "direct" evi-
dence which should have been 
presented in the State's case-in-
chief. Despite this determina-
tion, the trial court granted the 
State's motion to reopen its case-
in-chief, stating that the jury 
should not be deprived of rel-
evant evidence. Further, the 
court stated that neither the State 
nor the defense should be pun-
ished for the State's failure to 
present evidence when it should 
have. 
On appeal, the State ar-
gued that the trial court implic-
itly and explicitly made the req-
uisite findings to sustain its ex-
ercise of discretion. The Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland 
reversed the decision of the cir-
cuit court. The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland granted cer-
tiorari to resolve the question of 
whether the trial court abused 
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its discretion in allowing the 
State to reopen its case at the 
rebuttal stage of the trial and 
affirmed the court of special 
appeals. 
The court of appeals 
began its analysis by acknowl-
edging thattrial courts are vested 
with broad discretion in the con-
duct of trials. Id., at 68, 637 
A.2d at 1216 (citations omit-
ted). The court stated that in the 
usual case, what constitutes re-
buttal testimony rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial 
court. Id. (citations omitted). 
The court then proceeded to a 
discussion of the discretion a 
trial court exercises in deter-
mining what evidence is rebut-
tal and that which it exercises in 
determining whether to vary the 
order of proof. Id. at 69, 637 
A.2d at 1216 (citing Hepple v. 
State, 31 Md. App. 525, 534, 
358 A.2d283, 290 (1976), aff'd, 
State v. Hepple, 279 Md. 265, 
368 A.2d 445 (1977)). The 
court stated that the judge must 
consider whether the State de-
liberately withheld the evidence 
proffered in order to gain an 
unfair advantage by its impact 
on the trier of facts. Id. To this 
end, the court noted that the 
judge must discern whether the 
proposed evidence is merely cu-
mulative to, or corroborative 
of, that already offered in chief 
or whether it is important or 
essential to a conviction. Id. at 
69,637 A.2d at 1216-17. Fi-
nally, the court noted that re-
gardless of how much discre-
tion it may have to vary the 
order of proof or to admit rebut-
tal evidence, a court may not 
exercise either discretion inter-
changeably with the other. Id., 
at 70, 637 A.2d at 1217 (cita-
tions omitted). 
The court addressed the 
issue of whether reopening the 
State's case impaired Respon-
dents' ability to answer or oth-
erwise receive a fair trial. Id. at 
76, 637 A.2d at 1220. The 
court stated that while good 
faith, or at least a reasonable 
basis for withholding the evi-
dence must be considered, the 
trial court's conclusion in that 
regard varied and was therefore 
unclear. Id. What was clear to 
the court was that the trial court 
determined that the State was 
aware of the importance of 
Knight's testimony before it 
closed its case, and the subse-
quent failure to call Knight in its 
case-in-chief was intentional, 
rather than inadvertent. Id. at 
77, 637 A.2d at 1220. The 
court of appeals acknowledged 
that the trial court's determina-
tion may not have been made in 
bad faith. Id. Nevertheless, 
misconceiving the nature ofthe 
evidence and the stage of the 
proceedings at which it was ad-
missiblewas not necessarily act-
ing in good faith, and in this case 
did not constitute good cause 
for reopening the State's case. 
Id. 
The court then focused 
on Respondents' defense, which 
used an ambiguity in the State's 
case to create reasonable doubt 
in the minds of the jurors. The 
court emphasized that such use 
of an ambiguity does not license 
the State to use direct evidence, 
of which it was aware before 
closing its case, to explain away 
the ambiguity. Id. at 78, 637 
A.2d at 1221. Moreover, be-
cause it was rather dramatic tes-
timony presented after the Re-
spondents' defense, such evi-
dence was quite likely to be 
given undue emphasis by the 
trier of fact. Id. The court of 
appeals explained that the trial 
court failed to consider the preju-
dicial impact, or probable preju-
dicial impact, of Knight's testi-
mony on the trier of fact. Id. 
Thus, the trial court did not 
directly address the likelihood 
that his testimony would render 
a fair trial impossible for both 
Respondents. Id. 
The court rejected the 
State's argument that the trial 
court made the requisite find-
ings to sustain its exercise of 
discretion: that the State did not 
act in bad faith and that the 
improper rebuttal did not sub-
stantially prejudice the respon-
dents. Id. at 79, 637 A.2d at 
1222. The court of appeals 
pointed out that although the 
trial court's findings supported 
the conclusion that the prosecu-
tor did not act in bad faith, the 
determination was undermined 
by the trial court's characteriza-
tion of the prosecutor's reasons 
for withholding Knight as a re-
buttal witness as "phony." Id. 
Recognizing that nei-
ther the intent nor motive prong 
is dispositive, the State argued 
that the trial court explicitly 
found that reopening the State's 
case would not be prejudicial to 
Respondents. Id. at 80, 637 
A.2d at 1222. The State bol-
stered its theory by underscor-
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ing the trial court's determina-
tion that Knight's testimony 
occurred just two hours and 
two witnesses after the State 
rested. It further maintained 
that this sequence of events sug-
gested that the trial court found 
that the defense had not been 
prejudiced by the late presenta-
tion of Knight's testimony. Id 
The court of appeals flatly re-
jected this argument, stating that 
while the length of the defense 
and the interval between when 
testimony should have been 
given and when it was given 
were factors to be considered in 
determining whether the defense 
was prejudiced, such factors 
were not dispositive nor the most 
important factors to be consid-
ered. Id 
In applying its analysis 
to the case at bar, the court of 
appeals stated that the prosecu-
tor elected not to offer Knight's 
testimony because she errone-
ously believed it to be proper 
rebuttal evidence. Id How-
ever, the bulk of Knight's testi-
mony was improper rebuttal as 
it neither explained, replied to, 
nor contradicted new matters 
presented by the Respondent. 
Id at 76, 637 A.2d at 1220 n.4 
(citing Thomas v. State, 301 
Md. 294, 309,483 A.2d 6, 14 
(1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 
1088 (1985)). By failing to 
offer such evidence in its case-
in-chief, the State allowed an 
ambiguity to exist, of which the 
defense sought to take advan-
tage. Id at 80, 637 A.2d at 
1222. The court held that when 
a defendant presents evidence 
at the close of the State's case, 
the State may not reopen its 
case simply to have the last word. 
Id The court further asserted in 
the instant case that once the 
trial court determined Knight's 
testimony was improper rebut-
tal, it could not then allow the 
State to reopen its case-in-chief, 
as that would result in unfairly 
permitting the State to piece-
meal its case. Id The court of 
appeals concluded that allow-
ing the State to offer such clari-
fying evidence was prejudicial 
as amatteroflaw. Id at 81, 637 
A.2d at 1222. 
State v. Booze is signifi-
cant because it emphasizes the 
importance of judicial economy 
and the desirability of maintain-
ing a fair and orderly trial. In 
exercising discretion to allow 
the State to reopen its case, a 
trial judge must consider the 
nature of the testimony and its 
relationship to testimony already 
presented. To allow a party to 
introduce rebuttal evidence of 
which it was fully aware at the 
beginning of trial would place a 
premium on ignorance and lack 
of preparedness rather than on 
diligence and preparation. Fi-
nally, courts will more likely 
consider whether the prejudi-
cial impact of the admission of 
challenged testimony under-
mines a defendant's right to a 
fair trial. 
- Kimberly C. Foreman 
